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Abstract 
On 24 November 2009 the European Commission published its consultation paper on the EU 
2020 strategy. This paper analyses European trade union responses, and contrasts the very 
limited participation in the exercise with the greater response to the Green Paper Modernising 
Labour Law three years earlier. It argues that a key explanation is growing trade union 
disenchantment with the evolution of the 2000 Lisbon Strategy – embraced remarkably 
uncritically at the time – as it developed over the subsequent decade. In effect, the neoliberal 
implications of European integration have become increasingly unencumbered by any 
pretence at a ‘social dimension’. It is far from clear that trade unions have as yet a strategy to 
respond to the far harsher European policy environment. 
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Trade Unions, Lisbon and Europe 
2020: From Dream to Nightmare 
 
1. Introduction 
The starting point for this paper was a relatively small puzzle. I wished to 
analyse trade union responses to the European Commission’s public 
consultation on its draft Europe 2020 proposals.1 Though the Commission 
published a substantial number of reactions, those from unions and related 
organisations were very limited. Why was this? 
This initial puzzle provokes some larger questions: the character of the 
original Lisbon strategy, and the reasons why most European trade unions – 
as well as employers’ organisations – initially received it so enthusiastically. 
Lisbon can be viewed as an inherently ambiguous set of incompatible policy 
objectives, pointing either to social regulation of market outcomes or to the 
hierarchical dominance of market over society. Such ambiguities were largely 
removed with the Commission’s 2005 New Start, which in turn led logically to 
the EU 2020 initiative: the ‘social dimension’ to the strategy, always a 
subordinate element, was increasingly downgraded, with the priority of 
neoliberal market-making correspondingly highlighted. Broader attempts to 
engage ‘civil society’ in the policy agenda can be seen as purely cosmetic 
adjuncts to the growing technocratic character of EU decision-making.  
                                                        
1 The original consultation document in November 2009 – COM(2009) 647 final – used the title 
EU 2020. The Communication of March 2010 – COM(2010) 2020, which set out the final 
proposals and was approved by the Heads of States and Governments in June 2010, was entitled 
Europe 2020. Why the change? Some suggest that it was decided that ‘EU’ sounded too remote 
and bureaucratic to most citizens while ‘Europe’ was more user-friendly. 
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A larger puzzle is therefore why the majority of European trade unions were 
for so long supportive of a project of European integration in which neoliberal 
aims predominated. After suggesting some explanations, I conclude by 
discussing the options for trade unions in responding to the challenges of a 
European political economy which is patently hostile to workers’ rights. 
 
2. Trade Unions and the EU 2020 Consultation 
On 24 November 2009 the European Commission published its consultation 
paper on the EU 2020 strategy, with a deadline for responses of 15 January 
2010. Evidently, these seven weeks included a holiday period; and the 
window of opportunity was even narrower for some countries – the 
Hungarian Economic and Social Council complained that it took over two 
weeks for the Commission to upload the consultation document in their own 
language. This timetable was widely criticised, and differed markedly from 
the four months allowed for consultation on the Green Paper Modernising 
Labour Law to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century in 2006-07. Moreover, the 
Commission published its own, very complacent – indeed ‘token’ (Barbier 
2011: 17) – evaluation of the outcomes of the original Lisbon strategy only 
after the deadline for replies.2 For the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC), an additional concern was that the very process of public online 
consultation was suspect, seemingly assigning equal weight to the views of 
private individuals and representative organisations, thereby undermining 
the privileged interlocutor role which the Treaties assign to ‘management and 
labour’ (the ‘social partners’) at European level. 
                                                        
2 SEC(2010) 114 final. The European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) had already published a 
detailed assessment which concluded (2009: 52) that ‘the Lisbon Strategy has not achieved its 
objectives’. 
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In the event, there were some 1200 responses. Of these, 16 national and 10 
supranational trade union organisations submitted comments, with a few 
others from union-related institutions as well as contributions from national 
bipartite or tripartite bodies in Austria, Hungary and the Netherlands, and 
the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC).3 This may be 
contrasted with the replies from 50 national and 14 supranational trade union 
bodies to the Green Paper consultation. The unions and related organisations 
which responded to each consultation are listed in Table 1. It can be seen that, 
apart from EU-level organisations, the EU 2020 respondents were 
predominantly from the Nordic and Germanic countries, with none from the 
new Member States. The pattern in the Green Paper consultation was similar, 
apart from a far more substantial response from British unions.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
3 The Commission initially claimed – SEC(2010) 116 final – to have received ‘well over 1500’ 
responses. Its subsequent overview – SEC(2010) 246 final – stated that after eliminating 
duplication there were ‘around 1400 contributions’ including 45 from trade union organisations. 
These figures are well in excess of the total submissions included by the Commission in its 
detailed list of responses 
 (http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/eu2020/contributions_en.htm). 
4 Other consultations have resulted in far fewer trade union responses: for example only nine to 
the March 2009 consultation on hedge funds, four to the March 2010 consultation on the 
European Company Statute and six to the June 2010 consultation on Corporate Governance in 
Financial Institutions and Remuneration Policies – COM(2010) 284 final – all issues of 
considerable importance for trade unions at the time. 
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Table 1: List of Responses from Unions [and Related Organisations] 
 
EU 2020 
European Organisations 
European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC)  
European Federation of Food, Agriculture & 
Tourism Trade Unions (EFFAT)  
European Federation for Public Service 
Unions (EPSU)  
European Metalworkers Federation (EMF)  
European Mine, Chemical and Energy 
Workers’ Federation (EMCEF) 
European Trade Union Committee for 
Education (ETUCE)  
Eurocadres  
European Confederation of Independent 
Unions (CESI) 
[Spring Alliance] 
[Europäisches Zentrum für 
Arbeitnehmerfragen] 
Nordic Organisations 
Nordens Fackliga Samorganisation (Council 
of Nordic Trade Unions, NFS)  
Association of Nordic Engineers (ANE)   
AT 
Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund (ÖGB) 
[Bundesarbeitskammer] 
BE 
Algemeen Christelijk Vakverbond/ 
Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens 
(ACV/CSC) 
[Algemene Christelijke 
Werknemersorganisatie] 
DE  
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) 
Deutscher Beamtenbund (DBB) 
[Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung] 
DK  
Landsorganisationen i Danmark (LO) 
ES 
Comisiones Obreros (CC.OO.) (Secretaríat 
for Youth)  
FI 
STTK (Confederation of Salaried Employees) 
Opetusalan Ammattijärjestö (Trade Union of 
Education, OAJ)  
Suomen julkisen alan ammattiliittojen (Public 
Services Unions’ EU Working Party, 
FIPSU)  
FR 
Confédération française démocratique du 
travail (CFDT) 
CGT Force ouvrière (FO) 
IT  
Confederazione italiana sindacati lavoratori 
(CISL) 
PT 
União Geral de Trabalhadores (UGT)  
SE  
Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation (TCO) 
Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation 
(SACO) 
UK  
GMB  
 
Green Paper 
European Organisations 
ETUC  
European Federation of Building and 
Woodworkers (EFBWW) 
EMF 
European Transport Workers’ Federation 
(ETF) 
European Federation of Journalists (EFJ) 
UNI-Europa 
EURO-MEI (Media, Entertainment and 
Arts) 
European Group of the International 
Federation of Actors (EuroFIA) 
Eurocadres  
International Federation of Musicians (FIM) 
Federation of Scriptwriters in Europe (FSE) 
CESI 
European Federation of Employees in 
Public Services (EUROFEDOP) 
Nordic Organisations 
NFS  
AT 
ÖGB 
GPA-djp 
Gewerkschaft vida 
[Bundesarbeitskammer] 
[Österreichische Ärztekammer] 
BG 
KNSB/CITUB 
CY 
Pan-Cypriot Labour Federation (PEO) 
CZ 
Odborové Sdruzeni Zeleznicaru (Railway 
Trade Union, OSZ)  
DE  
DGB [plus one DGB region] 
Ver.di  
IG Metall 
IG Bauen-Agrar-Umwelt 
Deutscher Journalisten Verband [DJV] 
Marburger Bund 
[Bundesärztekammer] 
[Christlich-Demokratische 
Arbeitnehmerschaft (CDA)] 
DK  
Kristelig Fagbevaegelse  
ES 
CC.OO. (Catalunya)  
FI 
STTK  
Suomen Journalistiliitto 
FR 
Confédération générale du travail (CGT, 
IBM section) 
FO 
Confédération française de l’encadrement 
(CFE-CGC)  
IE 
Irish Congress Trade Unions (ICTU) 
IT  
    Confederazione generale italiana del lavoro  
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Union reactions were overwhelmingly critical, though to differing degrees. 
The ETUC submitted an ‘initial commentary’ of only six pages (which 
contrasted with its 31-page response to the Green Paper). The policy of ‘free’ 
and deregulated markets had failed. Social policies should be central to a new 
EU strategy, involving greater employment security, ‘robust’ unemployment 
benefits, active labour market policies, improved job quality, reduced 
inequality, fair pensions and a defence of social protection systems and public 
services. The Commission had given insufficient attention to the exit from the 
economic crisis, the need to regulate financial institutions and the problem of 
global trade imbalances. Corporate governance should be reformed in order 
to combat short-termism. Overall, the ETUC argued, ‘the immediate priority 
for us all is not 2020 but the implementation at European level of a bigger 
recovery plan’. 
Most other responses were brief, but some were more detailed and sharper in 
tone than the ETUC document. Perhaps the most pointed critique came from 
the French Force ouvrière, which summarised its reactions as follows: a 
particularly poor document, drowned in insipid Community jargon; lacking 
ambition and strategic vision; a narrow, indeed dangerous perception of the 
social and environmental challenges; a document that buries industry, Social 
Europe and sustainable development; demonstrating a distressing fatalism in 
the face of unemployment, precarious work and inequality; a document 
which endorses permanent labour market  insecurity; which chooses 
continuity, despite the consequences of the crisis and the failure of the Lisbon 
strategy.... There were a number of similar themes in most trade union 
responses. First, the Commission was proposing ‘more of the same’ without 
acknowledging that the Lisbon strategy had failed to achieve its goals or 
analysing the reasons. Second, the immediate priority should be to tackle the 
economic crisis, which required an expansionary recovery plan; but the 
Trade Unions, Lisbon and Europe 2020 
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Commission was proposing the opposite, restraint in public finances. It also 
neglected the need for stronger regulation of financial markets in response to 
the crash of 2008-09. Third, more generally, the Commission’s proposals 
embraced a narrow conception of competitiveness which subordinated social 
to economic objectives: there was an imbalance between economic, social and 
environmental goals. Fourth, more attention should be addressed to the 
problems of poverty, inequality and precarious work. Other points 
emphasised were the need for a stronger gender dimension to the analysis 
and strategy; a more systematic industrial policy (highlighted in particular by 
manufacturing unions); the importance of quality public services 
(particularly, but not exclusively, stressed by public sector unions); and the 
need for an enhanced role of the social partners in policy development and 
implementation.  
As indicated above, my small puzzle was why so few trade unions responded 
to the consultation, when those that did were clearly dissatisfied with the 
Commission’s proposals. The inadequate time allowed must be part of the 
explanation: trade unions are democratic organisations and cannot give 
instant reactions to major policy initiatives. Union resources are also 
increasingly under strain. In addition, the Green Paper had raised a number 
of very specific questions which related centrally to the unions’ role in 
employment protection; the EU 2020 document was more diffuse. But beyond 
this, one might detect an alienation from an essentially sham consultation 
process. To assess this hypothesis, one must go back to Lisbon, and indeed the 
broader issues of the ‘European social model’. 
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3. The Ambiguities of the Lisbon Strategy 
The Lisbon European Council in March 2000 famously declared that ‘the 
Union has today set itself a new strategic goal for the next decade: to become 
the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world 
capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater 
social cohesion’. The specific labour market targets set out were ‘to raise the 
employment rate from an average of 61% today to as close as possible to 70% 
by 2010 and to increase the number of women in employment from an 
average of 51% today to more than 60% by 2010’. 
The Presidency conclusions highlighted the need for ‘combating social 
exclusion’, adding that ‘the best safeguard against social exclusion is a job’. 
(This is true up to a point, of course, but ignores the problem of the working 
poor: a theme which many unions highlighted in responding to EU 2020.) The 
strategy identified four ‘key areas’ to be addressed: ‘improving employability 
and reducing skills gaps’; ‘giving higher priority to lifelong learning as a basic 
component of the European social model’; ‘increasing employment in 
services, including personal services’; and ‘furthering all aspects of equal 
opportunities, including reducing occupational segregation, and making it 
easier to reconcile working life and family life, in particular by setting a new 
benchmark for improved childcare provision’. These themes overlapped quite 
closely with the four ‘pillars’ of the European Employment Strategy (EES) 
launched in Luxembourg at the end of 1997: employability, entrepreneurship, 
adaptability and equal opportunities. 
The ETUC reaction to the European Council’s conclusions was enthusiastic. 
The then general secretary, Emilio Gabaglio, stated that ‘the Lisbon Council 
has marked a change of spirit and priority as far as addressing the problems 
facing the European economy is concerned. Stability is no longer the 
Trade Unions, Lisbon and Europe 2020 
 
 4 
dominant feature. Growth and employment are also being taken into 
account.’ He ‘welcomed the European Council’s recognition of the social 
partners’ role in this whole process and appreciated the encouragement given 
to the social partners to negotiate agreements in the areas of innovation and 
lifelong learning, noting that trade union proposals on these issues have 
already been drawn up and are awaiting a response from European-level 
employers’ (Broughton 2000). In a resolution adopted in October, the 
Executive Committee declared that ‘the ETUC agrees with the analysis ... 
reflected in the European Council conclusions in Lisbon; namely that there is 
a link and a synergy between economic and social progress’ (Executive 
Committee resolution, 25-6 October 2000). Three years after the Lisbon 
Council, the ETUC still insisted that that it marked a break with deflationary, 
neoliberal policies: ‘in March 2000 the Lisbon Strategy was adopted, and the 
[Stability and Growth] Pact was effectively buried. During the Strategy’s 
preparatory phase some governments had attempted to push just an 
“economic reform”, deregulation, agenda, but the strategy which finally 
emerged was, as the ETUC had sought, a broad and integrated one of 
economic and social renewal’ (Report on Activities 1999-2002: 8) 
Yet caution would have been more prudent. As van Apeldoorn and Hager 
(2010: 209-10) have noted, ‘what is perhaps most notable about the Lisbon 
strategy... is the enthusiasm with which it was embraced by actors ranging 
from business lobbies and employers’ associations to trade unions and social 
NGOs’. The ‘new strategic goal’ adopted at Lisbon was reminiscent of what, 
at the British Trades Union Congress, is known as the ‘composite resolution’. 
Different member unions submit conflicting proposals on a contentious policy 
issue, but are then pressed to agree through backroom negotiation a form of 
words which somehow embraces their opposing viewpoints. In this way, 
potentially embarrassing disputation is removed from the public arena. From 
Richard Hyman 
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the outset, the EES was a political compromise, and as such an attempt to 
achieve the unity of opposites: from the Delors White Paper of 1993 on 
Growth, Competitiveness and Employment through Essen, Amsterdam and 
Luxembourg, the underlying message was that the prescriptions of 
Keynesianism and monetarism, of social regulation and of deregulation, 
could somehow be harmonised through a technocratic fix transcending hard 
political choices.5 The Lisbon declaration was in the same tradition. Could all 
the desirable goals which were itemised be achieved simultaneously; and if 
not, what were the real priorities? The employers were confident that these 
matched their own agenda: ‘UNICE [now BusinessEurope] president Georges 
Jacobs stated that the business community is "happy with this new 
momentum in the EU to tackle to high unemployment rates through 
economic and structural reforms"‘ (Broughton 2000). 
Though the ETUC in retrospect praised the ‘balance’ between economic, 
social and environmental goals in 2000, this balance was hardly obvious in the 
Lisbon text. Key themes embodied the economic and structural reforms which 
UNICE welcomed: a call for ‘a regulatory climate conducive to investment, 
innovation and entrepreneurship’; ‘a complete and fully operational internal 
market’; ‘to speed up liberalisation in areas such as gas, electricity, postal 
services and transport’; ‘to promote competition’; ‘to make rapid progress on 
the long-standing proposals on takeover bids’; to ‘redirect public expenditure 
towards increasing the relative importance of capital accumulation’. All these 
objectives contained threats to trade unions and their members. Central to the 
(far briefer) discussion of social objectives was the aim of ‘modernising social 
protection’, which has come to constitute ‘one of the most prominent 
watchwords in EU policy discourse’ (Hansen 2005: 36). Modernisation is itself 
                                                        
5 As I have argued elsewhere (Hyman 2005), the concept of ‘flexicurity’ can be regarded as a 
composite resolution in a single word. 
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a deeply ambiguous goal, customarily a euphemism for cutbacks and 
privatisation. The specific labour market proposals, like the EES itself, were 
exclusively oriented to supply-side measures: whether ‘more and better jobs’ 
could be fostered without appropriate macroeconomic policies was simply 
ignored. One specific goal, increased employment in ‘services, including 
personal services’, might well be read as a call for more low-paid, low-quality, 
precarious jobs which are typical of this expanding sector. 
The ETUC view of Lisbon thus seems to have reflected a measure of wishful 
thinking and a very one-sided reading of the policy. It was at odds with most 
academic assessments. According to Begg (2008: 429), ‘the remedy that 
underlies the Lisbon strategy is “structural reform”, an expression that 
manages simultaneously to be ill-defined, obvious and accepted in most 
quarters as a “good thing”. Yet it is also a source of contestation, implies 
losers as well as winners, and often has a delayed or uncertain pay-off’. Daly 
(2006: 468-9) noted the ‘composite resolution’ character of the Lisbon 
declaration: it moved ‘hardly without pause for breath between concepts that 
are from different intellectual universes and spell quite different approaches 
to social policy’. The underlying philosophy, she continued, seemed to negate 
the view of the European social model as a mechanism of 
‘decommodification’ (Esping-Andersen 1990), protecting workers against the 
vagaries of arbitrary market forces: ‘the Lisbon embrace of poverty and social 
inclusion is a continuation of the subsidiary, market-making role attributed to 
social policy in EU development to date’ and implied a commitment ‘not for 
decommodification but for the creation of equal opportunities for 
commodification’. The notion of a ‘balance’ between economic and social 
objectives was viewed sceptically by Goetschy (2005: 74-5): ‘the functioning of 
the Lisbon strategy has shown a real risk of a hierarchical relationship 
between policy fields, rather than a genuine coordination’, with the outcome 
Richard Hyman 
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being shaped by the ‘overarching role of the Stability Pact’ (which the ETUC, 
as noted above, considered ‘effectively buried’ after Lisbon). Serrano Pascual 
and Jepsen (2006: 17-9) were critical of the ‘mythical status... accorded to 
gainful employment’, at the same time as increasing employment was 
regarded as a purely supply-side policy issue. The central concept of 
‘employability’ entailed that ‘political problems are... turned into matters of 
personal motivation and will’. As part of this ‘individualistic reformulation of 
the social question... the function of the welfare state becomes helping subjects 
to adapt to the new rules of the game of the current economic set-up’.6  
 
4. From the 2005 ‘New Start’ to EU 2020: Dropping the 
‘Social’ Fig Leaf? 
In defining its 10-year targets, the Lisbon Council envisaged a mid-term 
review of progress. In advance of this deadline, it commissioned two reports 
headed by former Dutch premier Wim Kok.7 In his first report (2003: 11) he 
concluded that ‘it is clear that, overall, Europe has a large gap to bridge to 
achieve the employment objectives set at Lisbon. Moreover, with the 
economic slowdown, unemployment has increased...’. The response, he 
argued, should involve ‘increasing adaptability of workers and enterprises, 
attracting more people to the labour market, investing more and more 
effectively in human capital, ensuring effective implementation of reforms 
through better governance’. In effect, this reiterated the supply-side focus of 
Lisbon together with the ‘structural reform’ demanded by the employers’ 
lobby. In the second report, in a section entitled ‘unblocking the blockages’, 
                                                        
6 Ironically, many of these more critical authors are closely associated with the ETUC. 
7 Until 1986 he had been president of the main Dutch union confederation, Federatie Nederlandse 
Vakbeweging (FNV). 
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Kok (2004: 18) again focused on the supply-side, market-oriented elements 
integral to the original Lisbon strategy, calling for ‘the completion of the 
internal market and promotion of competition, including services and 
financial services, the establishment of a favourable climate to business and 
enterprise, building an adaptable and inclusive labour market’. 
The mid-term review, entitled Working together for Growth and Jobs: A New 
Start for the Lisbon Strategy,8 embraced the same perspective. The Commission 
defined the ‘two principal tasks’ as ‘delivering stronger, lasting growth’ and 
‘creating more and better jobs’. But the path to these desirable goals was to 
follow the old prescriptions, with a central role for ‘adaptability of the 
workforce... flexibility of labour markets... a more mobile workforce’. There 
was a call to ‘modernise social security systems’, again; and to ‘extend and 
deepen the internal market...; competition rules must be applied proactively...; 
a healthy and open services sector is increasingly crucial...; structural 
reforms... should be pivotal in the renewed Lisbon strategy’. The ‘better 
regulation’ agenda was highlighted, while ‘the continued pursuit of stability-
oriented macroeconomic policies and of sound budgetary policies will be 
crucial’, with a particular emphasis on ‘maintaining or pursuing sound public 
finances’. 
The re-launch should be understood as a primarily ideological reassertion 
that market liberalisation was the recipe for employment policy. As Zeitlin 
comments (2008: 437), ‘the mid-term review of the Lisbon Strategy was a 
surprisingly non-evidence-based process’. He adds (2008: 441) that while ‘the 
European Council has repeatedly reaffirmed that greater social cohesion and 
the fight against poverty/social exclusion remain core objectives of the Lisbon 
Strategy... this political commitment... has not been reflected in the guidelines 
provided to Member States’. Accordingly, ‘the 2005 mid-term review... 
                                                        
8 COM(2005) 24 final. 
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focused on competitiveness at the expense of social and environmental issues. 
Undoubtedly, the main reason for this bias pertained to the dominant political 
preferences within the Council during the last decade characterised by a 
growing majority of conservative governments’ (Magnusson 2010: 18). 
Hence the original ambiguity was reduced: in its call for neoliberal 
restructuring, the ‘New Start’ – warmly welcomed by the employers – largely 
reasserted what had gone before; but the fig leaf of a ‘social dimension’ was 
largely dropped. For the ETUC, this signalled a dangerous change of 
direction. In a resolution adopted by the Executive Committee on 15-16 March 
2005 it complained that ‘a number of important elements are missing.... The 
different documents of the Commission rarely give the impression of a new 
start to the Lisbon strategy, they are to some extent contradictory and 
therefore not a good example for a better European governance.’  
The ETUC noted that the Lisbon targets for growth and employment had 
been dropped or ‘scaled down’ and hence that ‘the Commission’s proposals 
for the mid-term review fall short of what is needed’. It questioned whether 
‘economic, social and environmental policies’ remained in balance, and 
contested the Commission’s fixation with ‘the mantra of labour market and 
welfare reform’. In a subsequent ETUI publication, Degryse (2009: 11-2) 
argued that the renewed Lisbon Strategy ‘broke with the equilibrium of the 
early days, in that the economic objective of competitiveness became the sole 
priority’ and embraced a ‘logic of deregulation (the “better – i.e. less – 
regulation” mantra) and flexibility’. As van den Abeele commented in 
another ETUI publication (2009: 1), ‘scrutiny of the Better Regulation agenda 
reveals the European Commission’s use of doublespeak. Feigning a concern 
for modernisation, simplification and improvement of the quality of 
Community regulation, the Commission has embarked, with the help of the 
Trade Unions, Lisbon and Europe 2020 
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Council and the tacit approval of the European Parliament, on an insidious 
enterprise to deregulate the Community acquis’ – since any rules providing 
rights and protections for workers necessarily constitute ‘burdens on 
businesses’.  
Yet the ETUC position itself displayed a curious ambiguity. Two weeks before 
the Executive Committee adopted its critical resolution, the ETUC issued a 
joint declaration with UNICE and CEEP, placing central emphasis on 
‘competitiveness’ as the core of a renewed Lisbon Strategy. The statement 
consisted partly of bland generalities but also of more dangerous ambiguities, 
with a call for ‘entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial spirit across society’, a 
focus on ‘employability’ as the main labour market issue, a demand for 
‘efficient’ social protection systems, ‘better regulation’ with ‘no distortions of 
competition’, and ‘sound macro-economic policies’ involving discipline in 
fiscal, monetary and wage policies. What was the real ETUC position? Was 
there disagreement at the heart of European trade unionism? The debate on 
the draft Constitutional Treaty was at its height, with the French referendum 
which was to kill the Treaty taking place in May 2005. It is plausible to 
assume a tacit consensus not to rock the boat. 
 
5. EU 2020: Paradigm Shift or Continuity? 
As I outlined above, trade union responses to EU 2020 were far more critical 
than to its precursors in the previous decade. But how much had changed? In 
my view, what was involved was an adjustment of emphasis and 
architecture, rather than a fundamental change from the original Lisbon 
strategy.  
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The language was in some respects new: the final Commission 
Communication (though not the original consultation paper) was subtitled A 
Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth. As part of the rhetorical 
innovation, seven ‘flagship initiatives’ were announced: an ‘Innovation 
Union’, ‘youth on the move’, a ‘digital agenda for Europe’, ‘resource efficient 
Europe’, an ‘industrial policy for the globalisation era’, an ‘agenda for new 
skills and jobs’ and a ‘European platform against poverty’. Specific targets for 
2020 were that 75% of those aged 20-64 should be employed (as against 69% 
when EU 2020 was written); 3% of GDP should be invested in research and 
development (as against the current figure of under 2%); the 20-20-20 energy 
package agreed in 2009 should be implemented (20% cut in greenhouse gas 
emissions, 20% reduction in energy consumption, 20% increase in the share of 
renewables); the proportion of early school-leavers should be under 20% 
while 40% of school-leavers should obtain a university degree; a reduction of 
25% (20 million people) in those below national poverty lines (60% of median 
disposable income). 
How would these goals be achieved? The recipes remained very familiar: ‘a 
stronger, deeper, extended single market’; removal of ‘bottlenecks to cross-
border activity’; ‘improving the business environment’; ‘reduce 
administrative burden on companies’, ‘modernising labour markets, training 
and social protection systems’; ‘define and implement the second phase of the 
flexicurity agenda’; ‘pressing ahead with the Smart Regulation agenda’ (a 
new euphemism for ‘better’, meaning less, regulation of the labour market); 
‘consolidation of public finances in the context of the Stability and Growth 
Pact’.  
All this would require ‘stronger economic governance’. A new framework 
would increase EU surveillance of national policies, linking the EU 2020 
Trade Unions, Lisbon and Europe 2020 
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agenda explicitly to the (deflationary) Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). This 
was elaborated in June 2010 by the European Council, and further by the 
Commission in its Communication Enhancing Economic Policy Coordination for 
Stability, Growth and Jobs: Tools for Stronger EU Economic Governance.9 This gave 
the green light for further initiatives to impose an austerity regime across the 
EU, with a draft Directive published in September 2010 on Requirements for 
Budgetary Frameworks of the Member States and adopted in autumn 2011.10 In a 
further turn of the screw, the Council in March 2011 adopted the Euro-Plus 
Pact, an even more stringent successor to the SGP. As the Director of the ETUI 
argued (Pochet 2010b), the implications of the new economic governance 
were disturbing, institutionalising pressures for pensions cuts, wage restraint 
and cutbacks in social protection. Even more radical was the pact endorsed by 
26 member states in December 2011, which provided that the EU institutions 
could impose austerity measures on member states with budget deficits.11 
As before, the response of the ETUC to the evolving 2020 strategy was 
ambivalent. As outlined above, its comments on the initial Commission 
proposals were critical. When the final version was issued in March 2010, the 
general secretary, John Monks, issued a statement declaring that ‘the 2020 
exercise so far is flawed and disappointing. There is a desperate need for the 
EU and the rest of the world to digest what caused the crisis and how we can 
avoid a repeat. How to deal with rising unemployment, especially among the 
young; how to tackle all the incentives in current tax systems and capital 
markets which encourage speculation and short-termism at the expense of 
long-term commitment to the real economy; and how to find new ways of 
raising public funds, especially using Financial Transaction Taxes and 
                                                        
9 COM(2010) 367 final. 
10 COM(2010) 523 final. 
11 The proposed Treaty revisions which would have given effect to this coercive regime were 
vetoed, somewhat ironically, by the UK government – one of the most fervent exponents of 
deflationary austerity policies. An indication, perhaps, that politics can still sometimes trump 
economics. 
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Eurobonds.... The Commission cannot expect to go back to business (and the 
Lisbon strategy) as usual.’ Indeed a paper issued at the same time (ETUC 
2010) argued that the deflationary policies being pushed by the EU were 
‘worse than “business as usual”‘. What was required was a radical change of 
course, to replace an ideologically driven economic strategy which had clearly 
failed. Employment policy should ‘refocus on the demand side of the labour 
market’; renewed growth should be founded on quality jobs, enhanced 
security and stronger workers’ rights. To avoid the risks of social dumping, 
the EU should adopt a Social Progress Protocol – first demanded by the ETUC 
in 2008 – and should strengthen the Posted Workers’ Directive. The ETUI also 
presented an analysis (Pochet 2010a) which concluded that the proposals 
were ‘weak and contradictory’. The strategy defined ambitious targets, but 
these could not be achieved if the SGP and the internal market were assigned 
priority. ‘No reflection is given to the tensions or contradictions between the 
different aims’; these were ‘camouflaged by “euro-jargon newspeak”‘. Any 
concern with job quality had ‘disappeared from the new strategy’, a reflection 
of the subordination of social to economic rights. As a later and more 
elaborate critique insisted (ETUI 2011: 5), ‘if the (macro)economics are wrong, 
all the other laudable targets and procedures in the Europe 2020 strategy – 
raising education standards and R&D spending, reducing poverty – will 
prove entirely illusory, further undermining the credibility of Europe’. 
In all these respects, the ETUC was clearly critical of the EU strategy, far more 
so than when Lisbon was launched a decade earlier. Yet this scepticism 
coexisted with a more accommodating posture. In March 2010, a few weeks 
after denouncing EU 2020 as ‘business as usual’, the ETUC signed with the 
employers an Agreement on Inclusive Labour Markets notable for its failure to go 
beyond bland and ambiguous generalities. ‘The European social partners 
consider that an inclusive labour market is fundamental in terms of fostering 
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economic development and social cohesion’; but the proposals for achieving 
this goal largely involved improved information channels, awareness-raising 
campaigns and enhanced employability. Perhaps unsurprisingly for a social 
partners’ agreement, there was no reference to macroeconomic policy, the 
demand side of the labour market, the need for decent pay and conditions, 
the problems of precarious work, the need for strengthened workers’ rights 
and collective voice – all factors highlighted in the reactions to EU 2020. This 
silence, however, implied acquiescence in the employer-oriented policy 
priorities of the Commission and the Council. 
Perhaps even more remarkably, in June 2010 the ETUC together with the 
employers’ organisations issued a Joint Statement on the Europe 2020 Strategy.12 
This comprised a series of composite resolutions: ‘more and better jobs’ but 
also ‘fiscal sustainability’; ‘improving competitiveness’ but also ‘social 
cohesion’. At times the document verged on the incomprehensible: ‘the clear 
objective of macro-economic policies should be to regain scope for action and 
be able to mobilise the necessary resources to sustain growth-enhancing 
investments while ensuring the sustainability of public finances and social 
protection systems in order to maintain intergenerational solidarity and 
cohesion’. In effect, the positions of the signatories were fundamentally 
incompatible. There were repeated calls for a ‘right balance’ between 
inherently contradictory objectives; but the overall tenor of the statement was 
more in harmony with the employers’ demands and the neoliberal logic of the 
Commission and Council strategy than with the positions which the ETUC 
had elsewhere defended. Its signature added legitimacy to an employer-
driven reshaping of EU policy. To understand this contradiction, it is 
necessary to explore the underlying character of European integration and the 
ambivalent role of official trade union representation at European level. 
                                                        
12 http://www.etuc.org/a/7327 
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6. Technocratic Market-Making and the ‘Democratic 
Deficit’  
The EU 2020 process has highlighted the neoliberal character, once at least 
partially contained, of European integration. What the 1957 Treaty of Rome 
established was a European Economic Community (or Common Market). It 
was assumed that economic integration would bring social progress without 
the need for specific social regulation at European level. However, there were 
some fears that countries with inferior employment conditions would gain an 
unfair advantage in the common market (what would later be described as 
‘social dumping’). For this reason, the Treaty of Rome included Article 11813 
calling for harmonisation of working conditions and Article 119 prescribing 
equal pay for women. At the time, both were little more than pious wishes. 
However, market-making was effectively constrained by the determination of 
national governments to maintain their own ‘varieties of capitalism’, 
including their distinctive social (employment and industrial relations) 
regimes. Otherwise the Single European Act three decades later, designed to 
‘complete’ the single market, would have been superfluous. 
EU 2020 must be understood as an important manifestation of the growing 
erosion of the social constraints on market-making, and of an increasingly 
self-confident elitist, technocratic direction of the European polity. The 
éminence grise in this process has been the European Round Table of 
Industrialists (ERT), established in 1983 as a ‘club’ of elite European-based 
multinational companies, with a mission to shape EU policy in the interests of 
giant European companies. It was a key driver of the Single Market 
programme, and subsequently of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It 
pressed the concept of competitiveness onto the EU agenda (ERT 1994), 
                                                        
13 The numbering has altered with subsequent Treaty revisions. 
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introduced the principle of benchmarking (ERT 2006), and was one of the 
main architects of the Lisbon agenda (de la Porte et al. 2001: 293; van 
Apeldoorn 2000; van Apeldoorn and Hager 2010). 
During the Delors Presidency (1985-94), the dominance of multinational 
capitalist interests was partially qualified by a parallel (even if secondary) 
commitment to a ‘social dimension’ of economic integration. This 
commitment has now virtually disappeared: as Höpner and Schäfer argue 
(2010: 344, 351), ‘the aims and strategies of European integration have 
changed over the last 10-15 years’; initiatives are increasingly ‘aimed at 
liberalising organised market economies, ultimately pushing them towards 
the Anglo-Saxon model’. In part this reflected a political shift to the right 
within Member States and hence the Council, greatly reinforced by 
enlargement. The ideological orientations of the Commission changed 
accordingly, as did its internal balance of power, with the Directorate-General 
for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) increasingly dominant across 
a range of policy areas, particularly following EMU. This status has been 
greatly reinforced by the economic crisis and by the ‘stronger economic 
governance’ embodied in the EU 2020 strategy. 
‘The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in 
accordance with the provisions of the Treaties’;14 while ‘restrictions on the 
freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of 
another Member State shall be prohibited’.15 Scharpf (1999, 2002) has analysed 
the implications in terms of a dynamic of ‘negative integration’: 
Europeanisation has been primarily institutionalised through mandating the 
elimination of national regulations which constitute obstacles to free 
                                                        
14 Article 26 TFEU. 
15 Article 49 TFEU. 
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movement. Negative integration reflects the priority of economic over social 
and political integration: a common market can be understood primarily in 
terms of freedom from regulations which inhibit cross-national exchange, 
whereas the creation of a social community would depend on rights which are 
entrenched in new regulatory institutions. The Treaty of Rome established 
Community competence primarily in market terms; the Single European Act 
was most mandatory and specific in the field of market-making (with the 
formalisation of qualified majority voting primarily directed to this end); the 
Maastricht Treaty, though celebrated by the trade union movement for its 
social chapter, was most binding in outcome in respect of the deflationary 
convergence criteria for EMU; the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 reaffirmed neoliberal 
economic imperatives in unambiguous terms while giving far more diffuse 
approval to social goals. Hard law applies to market-making, at best soft law 
to social protection. 
Scharpf has stressed the political implications of the ‘constitutional 
asymmetry’ between economic rights and social protections. ‘The strong 
strategic position of the Commission... derives from its power to take legal 
action, without prior authorization by the Council, against the violation of 
Treaty obligations by member states. With few exceptions, this power is 
limited to interventions against national barriers to free trade and mobility, 
and against national practices distorting market competition.... There are, 
then, powerful institutional mechanisms that have allowed the Commission 
and the Court of Justice continuously to expand the legal reach of negative 
integration without recourse to political legitimization’ (1999: 70). Three years 
later he elaborated this point: ‘the only thing that stands between the 
Scandinavian welfare state and the market is not a vote in the Council of 
Ministers or in the European Parliament, but merely the initiation of treaty 
infringement proceedings by the Commission or legal action by potential 
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private competitors before a national court that is then referred to the 
European Court of Justice’ (2002: 657).  
This was, alas, remarkably prescient. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
traditionally showed no inclination to treat national social protections and 
industrial relations institutions as illegitimate obstacles to market freedoms; 
on the contrary, many of its judgments in the 1970s and 1980s extended 
workers’ rights. But ‘it is a Court which, especially as a result of enlargement, 
has changed its practices, its constituency and the problems it is confronted 
with’, and in 2007-08 it ‘executed a radical U-turn, from an approach based on 
worker protection to an approach based on freedom to provide services’ 
(Kilpatrick 2009: 196, 208). Hence in the Viking and Laval cases in 2007 it 
adopted the principle that, irrespective of national law, industrial action 
which interfered with freedom of movement or establishment was legitimate 
only if it satisfied a ‘proportionality’ test. There followed in 2008 the Rüffert 
and Luxembourg cases, which set very strict limits on the extent to which 
public authorities could prescribe minimum employment standards if these 
interfered with the freedom to provide services. Jurisprudence has become ‘a 
mask for politics’ (Scharpf 2010: 216) 
It is by now obvious that there is a self-reinforcing dynamic at the heart of 
European integration: intensified market liberalisation both follows from, and 
in turn reinforces, the subordination of social policy to the overriding priority 
of ‘competitiveness’. Even the rhetoric of a social dimension has been 
marginalised: one symbolic change was the replacement of the Social Action 
Programme in 2000 by a more passive Social Agenda. Cerny (1997: 251) has 
written that ‘the transformation of the nation-state into a “competition state” 
lies at the heart of political globalization’, adding (2007: 272-3) that ‘rather 
than providing public goods or other services which cannot be efficiently 
provided by the market – in other words, rather than acting as a 
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“decommodifying” agent where market efficiency fails – the state is drawn 
into promoting the commodification or marketization of its own activities and 
structures (including the internal fragmentation of the state itself) as well as 
promoting marketization more widely in both economic and ideological 
terms’. The Euro-state, never having been encumbered by the constraints of 
democratic legitimation which exists in individual nation-states, has faced 
few obstacles in its transformation into a supranational competition state. This 
process is central to the analysis of Höpner and Schäfer (2010): it entails an 
increasing re-commodification of labour as national systems of social 
solidarity are eroded by marketisation, being reduced to what Streeck (2001) 
terms ‘productivist-competitive solidarity’. Social protection is no longer an 
alternative to ‘free’ markets: it is an obstacle to market freedoms, unless it can 
be justified as a ‘productive factor’ which contributes to competitiveness. 
‘Instead of protecting people from the market, social policy is increasingly 
seen as helping them adjust to the market’ (Hermann and Hofbauer 2007: 
133). The EU 2020 programme demonstrates how, within current EU 
governance, social policy has been reduced to a subsidiary component of 
economic policy (Streeck 2001: 27). Hence it is entirely logical that, as noted 
above, DG ECFIN should increasingly take charge of the formulation of social 
policy; and the Lisbon strategy has encouraged a ‘strengthening of the 
influence of the EcoFin Council’, in parallel with the similar process within 
the Commission (Goetschy 2005: 74).  
‘Part of the power of the neoliberal EU project has lain in its ability to close 
itself off from democratic influence and accountability, and to render its 
decisions and practices non-transparent and immune from mass pressure’ 
(Storey 2008: 72). The culmination (to date) has been the creation in October 
2011 of the Groupe de Francfort (GdF) as an inner cabinet – or as some have 
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termed it, politburo – of the EU.16 ‘It has no legal structure or secretariat, but it 
is now the core within Europe’s core’ (‘Charlemagne’ 2011); ‘Europe is being 
run by a cabal’ (Elliott 2011).  
As a response to complaints of a ‘democratic deficit’, the ‘open method of 
coordination’ (OMC) was invented in the 1990s, supposedly as a mechanism 
for broadening input into the decision-making process. In practice, it serves 
primarily to incorporate those affected in the implementation of policies 
which are already predetermined: ‘OMC is subservient to the ideologies, 
path-dependencies and structures of Economic and Monetary Union’ 
(Chalmers and Lodge 2003: 2). The definition of benchmarks, strongly 
influenced by DG ECFIN, the Ecofin Council and the Economic Policy 
Committee (with the ERT never far in the background), establishes ‘terms that 
privilege fiscal discipline over social needs and social cohesion’ (de la Porte et 
al. 2011: 299). Following the initial Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty, 
there were cosmetic attempts to increase ‘transparency’ (Peterson 1995), and 
the Amsterdam Treaty established another response to criticisms of elitism: 
‘the Commission should [normally] consult widely before proposing 
legislation and, wherever appropriate, publish consultation documents’.17 
From this followed the online consultation regime, which came to cover over 
100 issues a year. Given the lack of discernible influence on policy outcomes, 
and the increasingly token character of the process, the inevitable result has 
been consultation fatigue, as declining trade union involvement clearly 
demonstrates. 
                                                        
16 The eight members are Christine Lagarde, director of the International Monetary Fund, Mario 
Draghi, president of the European Central Bank, President Sarkozy of France and Chancellor 
Merkel of Germany, Jean-Claude Juncker, chair of the Eurogroup, Herman van Rompuy, president 
of the Council, José Manuel Barroso, president of the Commission and Olli Rehn, Commission 
vice-president for economic and monetary affairs and the euro. 
17 Protocol 7. 
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In short, the evolution of EU policy-making, closely associated with Lisbon 
and EU 2020, has institutionalised a form of economic governance which is 
increasingly hierarchical and unaccountable, reduces political choices to 
technical alternatives and closes off space for genuine debate. Initiatives to 
add a ‘social’ or ‘democratic’ gloss to an essentially anti-social and anti-
democratic regime can be little more than lipstick on a pig. 
 
7. Trade Union Infatuation with ‘Europe’: The End of the 
Affair? 
So far I have argued that the Lisbon Strategy, and EU 2020, are neoliberal 
projects which the EU policy-makers have made diminishing efforts to cloak 
behind any rhetoric of a ‘social dimension’. There is thus a widening gulf 
between ideals of ‘Social Europe’ and the realities of actually existing 
European integration. This provokes two questions. First, why did most 
European trade unions become such enthusiastic supporters of actually 
existing European integration? Second, how do they respond when they are 
manifestly marginalised within EU policy-making? 
Dølvik (1997), in his detailed insider study of the ETUC, distinguishes 
between a ‘logic of membership’ and a ‘logic of influence’. The former 
requires unions to maintain their representative credentials by articulating the 
wishes and interests of their constituents. The latter requires them to adapt 
their aims and methods to the actual decision-making processes on which 
they wish to exert an impact. Balancing the two logics is a difficult art: neglect 
the logic of influence and one’s demands may be ineffectual; neglect the logic 
of membership and one loses representative legitimacy. ‘The seductive appeal 
of the social partnership rhetoric has been instrumental in bolstering 
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legitimacy and support around union claims for recognition and influence in 
the EU polity,’ but with the risk ‘that the ETUC representatives might become 
co-opted by the EU institutions’ (Dølvik and Visser 2001: 32). 
The decision-making process within the EU is often termed ‘comitology’: 
initiatives are formulated, analysed, revised, debated, further amended and 
reformulated, within an elaborate network of interacting committees, until an 
outcome emerges (or fails to emerge). This process has a strong technocratic 
bias: the focus of argument is diverted from principle to detail. One could say 
that this takes the politics out of policy: as Goetschy comments (2005: 77), ‘a 
relative “depoliticization” of decision-making and the reliance... on expert 
networks and procedural routine does not facilitate public political debate’. 
Likewise, de la Porte and Pochet note (2003: 34) that the involvement of the 
‘social partners’ in the policy process is intended to counteract the EU’s 
democratic deficit but fails to do so because those involved ‘operate through 
unknown mechanisms behind closed doors’. 
The ETUC is sucked into this process in part because of its dependence on 
‘borrowed resources’. ‘Because national union movements in Europe were 
reluctant to allocate resources and to grant it significant opportunities to 
acquire capacities on its own, the ETUC had to seek its building materials 
elsewhere, from friendly, but self-interested, European institutional elites’ 
(Martin and Ross 2001: 54). Gobin (1997) and Wagner (2005) have charted in 
detail how this material dependence has constrained the ETUC’s agenda and 
made comitology the line of least resistance. 
More insidious, perhaps, is the subtle interaction between discourse, ideology 
and practice. All who are familiar with the Brussels process, whether as 
participants or as observers, have come to talk a strange language. They speak 
easily of horizontal objectives and open methods, of the social partners’ route 
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and co-decision, of macroeconomic dialogue and transposition. They can 
master a whole lexicon of acronyms. This is the world of Eurospeak! 
European integration has generated an organising discourse which – 
presumably unintentionally – most effectively distances professional 
Europeans from the citizenry of European states. To the extent that Eurospeak 
has become the working language of the ETUC (and national union 
representatives active within its structures), their logic of membership is 
undermined by the fact that they speak a different language from those they 
seek to represent. Not only different, but actually opposed: ‘analysis of the 
official statements of the ETUC clearly shows a gradual integration of the 
employers’ vocabulary and, increasingly, a vocabulary produced by the 
administrative apparatus of the Commission, at the expense of a vocabulary 
expressing traditional trade union demands’ (Gobin 1997: 116). 
The consequence is a suppression of both political alternatives and 
mobilisation capacity. Throughout the long process of neoliberal market-
making, most European unions have lacked the nerve or the capacity to offer 
unambiguous opposition, which in turn dilutes the logic of influence. Take 
two of the biggest issues of economic integration. Had unions had been 
prepared to campaign against the Single European Act, unless it gave labour 
social rights which matched the economic benefits for capital, they might not 
now be pleading for a – surely unattainable – ‘social progress clause’. 
Likewise, ‘despite judging the design of EMU as fundamentally flawed, the 
ETUC continued to back it, arguing that it was needed politically to keep 
integration going’ (Martin and Ross 2001: 72). A more robust stance might 
have saved European citizens from the chaos that now afflicts us. The same 
has been true with ETUC support for the – at best ambiguous – revisions to 
the Treaties which were blocked by the referendum rejections in France and 
the Netherlands in 2005 but ultimately adopted in 2009. Throughout this 
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process, most union leaders have backed the ongoing process of integration, 
while most of their constituents have been opposed (Hyman 2010). 
Policies towards Lisbon and EU 2020 thus fit a longer pattern. ‘Europe’ has 
seemingly come to represent a value system and motivating ideology which 
has filled the vacuum left by the erosion of traditional trade union identities. 
Has it become impossible to challenge frontally the dynamics of actually 
existing European integration? ‘The ETUC offers renewed support for the 
internal market, but on condition that the new vision is socially and 
environmentally sustainable, leads to a strengthening of social welfare and 
the general interest, and promotes workers’ rights, and fair working 
conditions.’18 This composite resolution, adopted after publication of the final 
EU 2020 strategy, reveals a continued unwillingness to confront the reality 
that the internal market is weakening social welfare and undermining workers’ 
rights and fair working conditions. 
Is there an alternative? To maintain the relevance of trade unionism at EU 
level, there are surely three central priorities. First, trade unions need to 
negotiate their own policy agenda, not just in the Brussels committee rooms 
but through involvement with their memberships. In most countries, EU 
policy has traditionally been treated as a matter for ‘European experts’, who 
have typically been absorbed into the perspectives and discourse of the EU 
elite. Lack of organic connection to the rank and file has translated, inevitably, 
into the absence of effective bargaining power. What is needed is an ‘internal 
social dialogue’ in which serious debate on European issues is fostered within 
the mechanisms of trade union democracy. 
Second, as part of this process they must define, and campaign for, a concrete 
vision of a real European social model to meet the needs of workers and 
                                                        
18 Resolution on ‘A new social impetus for the Internal Market Strategy 2010-2015’, 9-10 March 
2010, http://www.etuc.org/a/7054 
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citizens in the 21st century. ‘Social Europe’ must be recognised as a terrain of 
struggle, not an empty label which suppresses debate: unions have to launch 
a battle of ideas to present an alternative vision to neoliberalism. The Athens 
congress of the ETUC in 2011 adopted the slogan ‘Mobilising for Social 
Europe’; what this means in practice is far from clear, though it is evident that 
the goals and priorities of different national affiliates are on many issues in 
conflict. Typically, the dominant response is still to seek a form of words 
which papers over the differences, rather than openly negotiating the 
competing visions of the future. 
Third, ‘On the Offensive’ – the slogan of the Seville ETUC congress in 2007 – 
has to mean a willingness to say no, shifting from social dialogue to the 
mobilisation of opposition to actually existing European integration. Though 
its leadership has now changed, the ETUC still seems determined to maintain 
the priority assigned to social dialogue – on an agenda defined by its 
opponents – with the mobilisation for an alternative restricted to token 
demonstrative action. This is to leave unambiguous opposition to actually 
existing Europeanisation to the political fringes, and in particular the 
xenophobic far right. Europe’s workers deserve better.  
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